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Abstract 
This dissertation is a philosophical critique of R.B.J. Walker’s and David Campbell’s 
respective contributions to poststructuralist thought on ethics in international relations (IR).  It 
focuses on how their work deals with the predominant question asked about ethics in IR in 
terms of its framing, the answers it calls for and the link between the two.  This question (here 
the question of ethics) asks what ethical conduct in IR is and even though Walker and 
Campbell undermine the concepts the question relies on, they ask questions similar to this.  
The dissertation is motivated by a suspicion that doing so might be inherently difficult as well 
as by a perceived lack of similar engagements.  The dissertation argues, through close 
readings of texts by Walker and Campbell, that their approach is different from that in 
normative IR in content, but similar in form.  This form of answer is taken to depend on their 
framing of the question of ethics and to induce tensions in their answers.  Due to the focus on 
these writers the knowledge claims will be restricted to their work and it will thus be argued 
that it seems inherently difficult for them to answer the question of ethics in coherence with 
the critique of normative IR that their work takes as point of departure.  Hence, the question 
limits their critical potential and their persistence in asking it circumscribes the debate about 
ethics in IR.  However, the dissertation refuses to go beyond the critique and search for a 
solution since this would contradict the suspicion that guides this work.  
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Introduction 
Questions about ethical conduct have over the last few decades become a thriving site of 
debate in international relations (IR) theory.  This is manifest in two theoretical 
developments: On the one hand, and intuitively, we see this in the increasingly popular 
literature referred to as normative IR theory.  This is a literature that takes the morality of state 
actions as its main concern1 and – in its current expression – follows influential work by John 
Rawls (1971) in political theory and by Charles Beitz (1979) and Michael Walzer (1977) in 
IR.  On the other hand, and for many much less intuitively, we also see a concern for ethics in 
poststructuralist thought in IR.  Notwithstanding the common allegations of amorality and 
nihilism (for a rebuttal see Der Derian 1997: 57-8), this literature has made ethics and the 
ethical relation a central concern (e.g. Campbell 1998a; 1998b; Walker 1993; 2003).   
However, the poststructuralist engagement with ethics is in many ways radically different 
from that in the literature of normative IR.  Indeed, poststructuralist thought aim to undermine 
the core assumptions of this literature.  For instance, Jacques Derrida, who is an important 
source of inspiration for IR poststructuralists, has even demonstrated the impossibility of 
ethics (1995: chapter 3).  Nevertheless, (at least some) IR theorists writing in a 
poststructuralist vein seem to retain the question asked in normative IR: namely, what is 
ethical conduct in international relations? (see Brown 1992)  This will in the following be 
referred to as the question of ethics.  
                                                
1 The notion of normative IR theory will be important to the dissertation.  This literature will be defined 
primarily as literature against which the poststructuralist literature on ethics in IR is formulated.  Hence, 
normative IR theory is taken to be comprised by normative studies in IR that does not take poststructuralism as 
their point of departure or in other words the more conventional literature on ethics in IR (see e.g. Brown 1992).  
This definition is considered sufficient only because this literature is not the concern of the dissertation. 
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Retaining the question of ethics whilst critiquing the concepts of the literature that 
conventionally asks it appears a straightforward and reasonable approach.  Indeed, it seems 
necessary in order to make possible communication with the conventional literature.  At the 
same time, and for the same reason, it also appears fundamentally difficult.  There is, namely, 
reason to suspect that the criticised concepts are inherent to the question or necessary for 
giving what is considered a plausible answer.  Hence, there is a risk for tensions and 
contradictions between the answer and the critique.  This forms the puzzle that motivates this 
dissertation and it will be elaborated on as the argument proceeds.  
My aim is to address this puzzling feature of the poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR.  
The rationale for doing so is twofold.  Firstly, critical engagement with poststructuralist 
thought in IR (and particularly concerning ethics in IR) is relatively rare (see below), even 
though criticism is abundant.  Such criticism is however seldom the result of theoretical 
engagement in which the authors’ assumptions and ideas are taken seriously; rather, 
‘poststructuralists’ are most often dismissed by a sleight of hand for being relativist and even 
dangerous (see George 1995: 215-6).  Hence, the dissertation is motivated by a perceived gap 
in the literature and the puzzle delineated above is a place to start when addressing this gap.  
Secondly, engaging with the question of ethics is also motivated by a general concern for 
the link between questions and answers and the dissertation is informed by a suspicion that 
this link might be more important than is often thought.  Here this relates to the framing of the 
question of ethics and what types of answers that are deemed appropriate.  The puzzling 
treatment of the question of ethics in poststructuralist thought then becomes an inroad to this 
exploration.  Indeed, it forms the most forceful critique of the assumptions of normative IR 
but also takes on the task of moving beyond critique to constructive thought2 whilst retaining 
                                                
2 For a discussion on poststructuralism as constructive, see (Der Derian 1997: 62). 
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the same question.  This makes possible an engagement with the framing of the question and 
its answers.  
This dissertation will engage with how the question of ethics is treated by two 
contributors to poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR (R.B.J. Walker and David Campbell). 
Importantly, the dissertation does therefore not aim to assess poststructuralist thought on 
ethics in IR.  Rather, I will focus on the two writers’ contributions to this literature and what 
that can tell us about the question of ethics in IR.  The knowledge claims that will be made is 
thus not thought to be generally applicable; rather, I intend to be able to say something about 
the authors under scrutiny, and about the question of ethics as they ask it.  Of course, since 
these writers are both central to this literature and their work has been influential, it is possible 
that the insights presented here has some broader purchase, but I will refrain from making any 
such inferences.  
The purpose of the dissertation is thus to critically engage the work of Walker and 
Campbell on ethics in IR with focus on the link between the question of ethics and the 
answers that are given to it.  These aspects are here treated as integral to one another.  Hence, 
the dissertation asks a question about a question: What does Walker’s and Campbell’s 
respective contributions to poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR tell us about the question 
of ethics in terms of its framing, the answers it calls for and the link between the two? 
The question will be answered in three steps that provide insights into three themes, 
which then are combined to answer my overarching question.  The first chapter will aim to 
provide insights into the poststructuralist critique of normative IR with focus on how it relates 
to how the question of ethics is framed and answered in the scrutinised literature.  This will be 
dealt with through R.B.J. Walker’s critique of normative IR.  But since he does not explicitly 
address the question of ethics, I will read Chris Brown’s (1992) discussion on normative IR 
through Walker’s critique in order to see what it tells us about the question of ethics.  The 
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second chapter addresses Campbell’s attempt of going beyond this critique in answering what 
seems to be the same question of ethics.  This aims to provide insights into the question of 
ethics in Campbell’s thought and how he goes about to answer it.  There, the focus will be on 
the differences and similarities between normative IR and Campbell’s formulation of a 
poststructuralist ethics and the first chapter thus sets the stage for the second.  In the third 
chapter, then, I discuss the results from the first two chapters with focus on the tensions 
between the critique and constructive work.  This aims to provide insights into the link 
between the framing of the question of ethics and the answers it seems to presuppose.  It is 
however important to note that this is not to be seen as a critique of Campbell through 
Walker; rather, as will become clear, their projects are integral to one another and the tensions 
that occur thus apply to both. 
The character of the investigation is thus best described as a philosophical critique of 
poststructuralist ethics or as second order theorising; that is, thinking about theorising.  For 
this purpose the abovementioned writers will be critiqued from the inside – on the basis of 
their own premises rather than adopting a position external to their setting by criticising these 
very assumptions.  The investigation is therefore focused on the writers under scrutiny and I 
will not engage with the literature that these writers, in turn, base their work upon.  For 
instance, I do not wish to contest these writers on the level of their reading of Derrida, since 
this would be to establish such an external position.  Furthermore, introducing Derrida or 
Levinas in the end would make them, or a different reading of them, look like a solution to the 
ethics problematic.  This would contradict my motivating suspicion that trying to solve old 
puzzles with new means might be difficult and limiting.  
These considerations also determine the methodology that will be used: namely, a close 
reading of the selected authors.  This kind of endeavour is not unproblematic and the most 
notable risk is that in the process of recounting the theorists’ viewpoints, these are made to 
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seem more coherent than they ever were (see Skinner 1969: 16).  The aim here is to make 
tensions obvious, but such an endeavour can never be complete and I will not attempt to 
compare different works of the same writer.  Rather, the aim is, as described above, to think 
about Walker’s and Campbell’s respective, and joint, work in relation to the question of ethics 
in IR.  
Poststructuralism and Ethics in IR 
Before embarking on the abovementioned work, it is appropriate to introduce the literature 
that is dealt with, motivate the choice of Walker and Campbell and briefly glance at the 
existing critique of these authors3.  This will be addressed in turn below.  
The first question that comes to mind when thinking about the topic of this dissertation is 
what poststructuralism is, and this raises an important caveat.  Defining poststructuralism is 
problematic since it is a diverse literature, those drawing on poststructuralist thought often 
refuse to label their work and doing so seems inconsistent with core poststructuralist 
assumptions.  Indeed, there are many different ways of interpreting poststructuralist thought 
and defining it is an inherently political act with no right or wrong answer; rather, the analyst 
imposes a definition that by necessity privileges particular writers and exclude others.  
Therefore, no definition will be given. 
Nevertheless, there are some uniting tenets of poststructuralist thought that pertains to the 
view on ethics in IR.  Most importantly, poststructuralist thought put into question what 
“seems natural, obvious, self-evident or universal, in order to show that these things have their 
history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and 
that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself” 
                                                
3 I will restrict my discussion to internal critiques. 
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(Barbara Johnson quoted in Edkins 1999: 74).  Hence, the main concern is the seemingly 
natural limits to our thought (Ashley & Walker 1990: 263; Zehfuss 2002: 246).  
This takes us to two other important notions.  First, poststructuralists in IR have 
undermined the rationalist-positivist reliance on philosophical realism and made explicit the 
political character of these assumptions.  The focus is, inter alia, the political character of 
representations of reality (Zehfuss 2002) and of concepts that we take for granted (e.g. the 
state)(Edkins 1999: 2-5).  This line of thought relies mainly on Foucault’s (1977; 1989) 
notions of archaeology and genealogy, and Derrida’s (1992a) deconstruction and thought on 
the “mystical foundations of authority”.  Relating to ethics in IR this has implied to question 
the ethical constitution of IR as a realm where there is no place for morality making obvious 
that this is a historically contingent conception infused with politics (Walker 1993).  
Second, poststructuralist writers have questioned the sovereign subject and, therefore, 
also the ethical subject.  Conventional accounts of ethics in IR are seen to “depend on the 
notion of a prior and autonomous sovereign subjectivity (whether it be the individual, the 
state, or some other corporate actor) deploying either a supposedly universal moral code (the 
deontological view) or muddling through their situation in order to achieve what might be 
thought of as the best possible outcome (the consequentialist account)” (Campbell & Shapiro 
1999: viii).  Poststructuralist thought undermines the autonomous and pre-social subject.  It 
then finds inspiration in Levinas and Derrida’s thought on how, identity, and subjectivity, is 
relies on difference (or différance) from the Other wherefore we are what we are only because 
of our relation with Others (Campbell 1998a, see also Derrida 1992b).  In this way, we are 
“intrinsically bound together in an ethic of responsibility, without ontological detachment 
clauses. … [and therefore] ‘it is impossible to free myself by saying, “it is not my concern”.  
There is no choice, for it is always and inescapably my concern’.” (George 1995: 210) 
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R.B.J. Walker and David Campbell formulate one of these positions respectively.  They 
are not, however, to be seen as representative in the generalising sense.  Rather, they are 
chosen because they have contributed extensively to poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR4.  
Of course, the insights drawn here could be generally applicable, but this would require 
connecting them to other writers.  This falls outside the scope of the dissertation and general 
insights will not be attempted.  However, this is not the purpose; rather, as laid out above, the 
purpose is to engage with the selected writers with the aim of discussing the question of 
ethics. 
Serious critical engagements with Walker or Campbell are relatively rare, and engaging 
with both is even less common, especially when focusing on the question of ethics.  One 
important exception is Molly Cochran’s attempt to assess poststructuralist ethics in which she 
touches on the question of ethics (1999: chapter 4).  The gist of her argument is that 
poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR retains notions of universalism and foundations that 
otherwise are criticised.  Indeed, even though these notions are qualified versions, they seem 
integral to speaking of ethics (ibid: 136-7).  This is a concern that is important for my 
purposes since it relates poststructuralist critique to poststructuralist ethics and implies that 
speaking of ethics presupposes universalism and foundations.  
When it comes to critiques that address one of the writers treated here, it seems that 
Walker’s work has been largely exempt from such engagement.  There are of course 
                                                
4 The case for choosing Campbell is more obvious than the one for choosing Walker.  Whereas Campbell “seeks 
to explore the ethical and political possibilities enabled by poststructuralist thought” (1998a: 3), Walker is more 
reluctant in using categories to describe his own work and uses poststructuralist thought in a somewhat disguised 
manner.  For instance, in Inside/Outside he relies on Derridean deconstructive genealogy (1993: 8, 13), but goes 
about his investigation in a seemingly commonsensical manner (see Brown 1994: 223, fn 22).  However, Lene 
Hansen positions him rather unambiguously in that category in her extensive portrait of his work (1997). 
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exceptions (see e.g. Bartelson 2001; Hansen 1997; Hoadley 2001) but the engagement on his 
view of ethics seems to be lacking.  There is thus a gap in the literature, which makes it 
interesting to engage with Walker’s work.  Campbell’s writing in general and on ethics in 
particular has attracted more attention, perhaps since his work more explicitly takes on the 
question of ethics.  Poststructuralist critique of Campbell has also been relatively extensive.  
Jim George (1995) has engaged with Campbell’s earlier work and makes a similar 
observation as Cochran – that the question of ethics seems to demand some sort of 
universality – but draws slightly different conclusions.  Rather than seeing this as a problem 
for poststructuralist ethics, George tries to avoid either-or thinking and problematises the 
notion of universalism.  He is however sceptical about Campbell’s reliance on Levinas for 
this, but still sees this work as potentially more productive than the flawed universalist ethics 
that allows for actions that should never be possible to justify (ibid: 211, 215).   
Other critiques are less celebratory and question Campbell for even formulating an ethics.  
Jenny Edkins notes that intellectuals, when talking about ethics, need to resist the “closure 
that comes with the status of ‘expert’ … [by refusing] to give an abstract, generalising answer 
to an ethico-political question.  Even a framing in terms of ‘an ethos of political critique’ or a 
‘struggle for … alterity’, as Campbell suggests, risks such abstraction.” (2005: 68)  Hence, the 
weak universalism that George saw impossible to avoid is criticised.  Mark Franke, in a 
related argument, sees Campbell’s work on ethics as totalising since it still refers to the 
international, and therefore relies on the idea of “being human” (2000: 324).  Franke claims 
that Campbell’s intentions can “be served only once ethics itself is renounced as an 
appropriate entry point to the political” (ibid: 307).  This idea is elaborated on by Madeleine 
Fagan (2006) who criticises Campbell for retaining a separation between ethics and politics 
(again a fundamental concern in the poststructuralist critique).  In brief, this makes ethics 
seem answerable and thus makes Derridean responsibility impossible (ibid: 29).  Fagan goes 
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on to argue that the problem seems to be that Campbell starts with Levinas who then is 
supplemented by Derrida.  This allows Campbell to overlook that Derrida, at least in Fagan’s 
reading, can be taken to argue that ethics is impossible since in fulfilling our responsibility to 
one Other we fail in responding to other Others. (ibid: 31-4)  These critiques all raise doubts 
whether the framing of the question might create pitfalls that poststructuralist ethics cannot 
avoid.  This suspicion informs the dissertation.  
  10 
1  Walker and the Critique of Normative IR 
In this first chapter I will engage with R. B. J. Walker’s work on ethics.  The reason for 
choosing Walker was, as we saw in the introduction, his centrality to the poststructuralist 
literature on ethics and because he formulates what is perhaps the most articulated 
poststructuralist critique of normative IR.  Here this critique will be related to how the 
question of ethics is framed and answered in normative IR.  Since Walker has not engaged 
explicitly with the question of ethics and since his treatment of the literature of normative IR 
is predominantly abstract, I will proceed by reading Chris Brown’s (1992) classification of 
this literature through Walker’s critique. However, engaging with this particular aspect would 
not make sense without a broader understanding of Walker’s work in general and on ethics in 
particular.  This will therefore be addressed in the first section.  In the second section I will 
then engage with the question of ethics as asked in the literature of Normative IR through a 
reading of Walker’s critique.  Finally, I will in a shorter section discuss where Walker thinks 
this critique will lead us, which also works as a bridge to the next chapter.  
Ethics and the Limits to our Political Imagination 
For Walker, IR theory does not help us to understand politics.  Rather, it is an expression “of 
the limits of the contemporary political imagination when confronted with persistent claims 
about and evidence of fundamental historical and structural transformation” (Walker 1993: 5).  
The quote contains the two components of Walker’s concern: that IR theory functions as a 
historically contingent limit to what we consider possible, and that this limit makes us fail in 
understanding the contemporary world.  He thus separates our situation from the means we 
use to grasp it, and notes a mismatch between the two.  New conditions thus warrant a 
rethinking of settled categories. (ibid: 22) 
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The same argument applies to ethics.  What is ethically possible in IR is limited by our 
political imagination and prevent us from responding to a necessity of ethical deliberations on 
a global scale that is stronger than ever (Walker 1993: 52; 1994: 265; 2003: 268).  But the 
literature of normative IR ignores these limits and thus does not “take the difficulty of 
speaking about ethics in the modern world seriously enough” (Walker 1993: 51).  The result 
is a “rather stale debate” (Walker 2003: 273) and, more importantly, that these limits are 
concealed in two ways: Firstly, Walker argues that normative IR assumes that IR (or politics) 
is separable from ethics since ethics can solve political problems.  This obscures how IR is 
already ethically situated through “accounts of ethical possibility” which limits our political 
imagination.  Secondly, Walker argues that normative IR assumes that ethics is separable 
from IR (or politics) and works as “a repository of principles awaiting application”.  This is 
also a limit – all possible ethical principles are already known – and obscures how ethics is an 
ongoing historical and political practice. (Walker 1993: 51, 79)  Therefore, in order to speak 
about ethics in IR we need to recognise and address these limits.  
Walker’s analysis of the limits of our political imagination targets the principle of state 
sovereignty.  This principle is seen as “the primary constitutive principle of modern political 
life” providing answers to questions about political community; i.e., “questions about who 
‘we’ are, where ‘we’ have come from, and where ‘we’ might be going” (Walker 1990: 160).  
But the question has been forgotten and the answer has come to seem natural; in other words, 
state sovereignty has become “an essentially uncontested concept” (ibid: 159).  But Walker 
stresses that this is one answer and that it has not always been as convincing; rather, “it was 
once bizarre and radical, even nonsense” (1993: 167).  Therefore, state sovereignty is seen as 
an answer we need to question (ibid: 64). 
The principle of state sovereignty emerged as an answer to what political community 
might mean when negotiating competing claims to universality and particularity in early-
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modern Europe.  A spatial transition from feudal hierarchies to dispersed autonomies and a 
temporal rejection of Christian universalism forced thinkers to grapple with new conditions in 
old categories. (Walker 1990: 164-5)  State sovereignty provides a spatiotemporal resolution 
to these competing claims that holds “extraordinary conceptual elegance” yet is 
underachieved so that its internal tensions have become indicative of the modern project 
(Walker 2003: 270).  Walker attempts to trace these tensions and in this way make obvious 
how the principle of state sovereignty limits our political imagination.  
Spatially, state sovereignty is a resolution of “the tension between the universalist claims 
of Christianity and Empire [or later humanity] and the competing claims arising from 
participation in a particular statist community” (Walker 1993: 61).  The solution makes both 
universality and particularity possible simultaneously by invoking “one system, many states; 
one Europe, or Christianity, or modernity and many (European, Christian or modern) peoples, 
cultures, nations and jurisdictions” (ibid: 176).  This results in political community being 
possible only on the inside of the state and, consequently, impossible on the outside.   
The spatial solution also resolves a temporal paradox between competing claims to 
contingency and claims to teleology and universalism (first Christian and classical, then a 
secular universalism with Enlightenment and the scientific revolution)(ibid: 39).  This 
provides for “the fundamental paradox of modernity: in a world characterised by increasing 
rationalisation … there is no rational way of deciding among an irreducible plurality of value 
commitments” (ibid: 56).  This insecure side of modernity is however looked upon as 
dangerous.  Nihilism and relativism are commonly seen as obstacles to the good life (ibid: 
54).  The spatial delimitation between an inside and an outside solves this predicament:  
“Within states, the possibility of universalist claims to the good, the true and the beautiful is 
opened up to actualisation in time. … Between states, however, the lack of community can be 
taken to imply the impossibility of history as a progressive teleology, and thus the possibility 
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merely of recurrence and repetition.” (ibid: 63)  This division between inside and outside has 
since then become defining of our political thought.  This is obvious in the division of labour 
between political and international theory: whereas political theorists aspire to progress, 
international theorists can hope for no more than alleviating the tragedies of eternally 
recurring conflicts. (ibid: 62, 125) 
Importantly, the inside and outside are mutually constitutive; i.e., both are the other’s 
condition of possibility.  Therefore, idealism is a more appropriate candidate than realism for 
a tradition of international relations theory, since realism “is unthinkable without the priority 
ascribed to universalist claims within political theory” (ibid: 42).  Cosmopolitan reasoning in 
normative IR, although in many ways appealing, thus makes it possible to argue that 
universalism is impossible in IR.  “Universalism, to put it bluntly and heretically, can be 
understood as the problem, not the solution.” (Walker 1993: 77; 2003: 268)  Hence, 
cosmopolitanism takes part in constituting IR as a realm of ethical impossibility.  However, 
this does not render speaking of ethics in IR impossible (many scholars actually do).  Rather, 
Walker’s point is that such discussions tend to oscillate between equally implausible 
alternatives (1993: 67-73) and “add up to a discourse that seems content to wish politics 
away” (2003: 284).  This is why it is so difficult to talk about ethics in IR and the only way 
out is to ask once again the questions about political community in terms of unity and 
diversity in this time of rapid transformations (Walker 1993: 21-2).  The literature of 
normative IR is thought to obscure such possibilities. 
Walker’s critique and the Questions of Normative IR 
In this section I explore how Walker’s critique of normative IR relates to how the question of 
ethics is framed and answered in this literature.  I will do this by reading Chris Brown’s 
(1992) classification of normative IR through Walker’s critique since this critique is highly 
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abstract and does not explicitly address the question of ethics.  The reason for choosing 
Brown is that his classification has been highly influential and attempts to cover the field.  
In International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches Chris Brown (1992) 
engages with the resurgence of normative studies in IR theory.  There he forwards a, now 
highly influential, reading of this literature as a debate between cosmopolitan and 
communitarian approaches.  Cosmopolitanism, Brown argues, is based in Enlightenment 
thinkers (e.g. Kant) and takes the rational individual and universal humanity as the starting 
point for ethics (ibid: chapter 2).  Communitarianism, on the other hand, is thought to be 
based in counter-Enlightenment movements such as Idealism or Romanticism (e.g. Rousseau, 
Herder, Hegel and Mill) and sees particular communities (most often states) as the basis for 
ethics (ibid: chapter 3).  In other words, the debate in normative IR concerns how we rate our 
responsibilities as human beings against our responsibilities as citizens (Robinson 1999: 73, 
see also Cochran 1999).  We thus see how the tension between universalism and particularism 
that Walker highlights sets stage for the contemporary normative debate in IR. 
The dichotomy fills two functions for Brown:  Firstly, it is an analytical device ordering 
IR theory.  He argues that this “classification is more or less inclusive for the modern age – all 
variants of international relations theory can be seen as falling into one or the other camp 
without to much violence being done to the intentions of the theorist” (1992: 27).  Secondly, 
the two strands work together as a framework from which political theories and positions can 
be formulated (ibid: 75-6).  So the dichotomy both classifies all that we already say and 
defines what makes sense to say.  Therefore, it contributes to the forgetting of the historical 
constitution of this debate and provides the basis for an oscillation between two positions 
which Walker sees as a “rather stale debate” (2003: 273).5  The cosmopolitan-communitarian 
                                                
5 These positions are ideal types and Brown argues that the gap might not be as big as suggested (1992: 110).  He 
also admits that this dichotomy only makes sense in the modern world (ibid: 27) and acknowledges that there are 
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debate thus provides a prime candidate for my analysis of what Walker’s critique of 
normative IR tells us about the question of ethics.  
After delineating his analytical framework Brown goes on to see how the different 
positions are played out when debating international political issues.  He applies his 
framework to what he sees as the three main agendas of normative IR: state autonomy, 
distributive justice and the use of force (1992: 103) by addressing the questions “Do states 
have a right to be left to their own devices?” (ibid: 109), Can war and the use of force be 
justified? (ibid: chapter 6) and How should the distributive injustices in the world be dealt 
with? (ibid: chapter 7).  The debate in normative IR thus seems confined to justifying 
particular (state) actions from cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives respectively.  
Hence, the question of ethics in normative IR is framed in terms of a political problem that 
has to be solved through recourse to already existing moral thought.  This resonates with 
Walker’s description of ethics in IR as presupposing an intersection between political 
problems and ethical principles, which is problematic since IR already is ethically situated 
through the principle of state sovereignty.   
Since politics and ethics are separated and ethics is seen as a guide for politics, we only 
need to find the correct principle to pass judgement on policy. This, however, proves 
painstakingly difficult in Brown’s analysis.  He notes regarding state autonomy that the 
absence of uncontroversial answers to these questions ought not to be surprising.  It is of the 
nature of this sort of question not to be answerable – there is a clash of values involved, each 
of which is real, and in such circumstances it is unrealistic to expect that a background 
                                                                                                                                                   
critical approaches that try to transcend this debate.  These are however dismissed since “rather better reasons 
than those offered by Derrida or Barthes would be required before most people would be prepared to throw 
overboard the social thought of two-and-a-half millennia” (ibid: 235). 
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theory can always be found which will reveal that the clash is more apparent than real. 
(Brown 1992: 126, see also 183) 
Brown’s reading of the literature as a cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy thus makes the 
question of ethics insoluble (Robinson 1999: 75).  This is in line Walker’s argument on “the 
fundamental paradox of modernity”; i.e. that an increasing rationality cannot help us decide 
between competing values (1993: 56, see also 1993: 53).  But, as we saw, the framing of the 
debate made those who reject final solutions seem relativist and even dangerous.  This, 
Walker argues, is a rationale for forgetting that Machiavelli’s work was tentative deliberations 
on a new reality in the formulation of a realist canon, and for Weber to opt for realist power 
politics after having struggled with the temporal tensions in modernity (Walker 1993: 72).  It 
is also something that can be seen in normative IR. 
Even though Brown sees the question of ethics as fundamentally unanswerable, this is not 
how the question is treated by the thinkers he analyses.  Rather, the protagonists in this debate 
seem, in Brown’s analysis, to propose final answers that render other answers unnecessary.  In 
this way, they all aim for universally applicable principles, whether these are derived from a 
common humanity or from putting the own community first.  Indeed, communitarian 
approaches also presuppose a notion of universal truth since their guiding principle is that the 
state is the most important community and that the members of such communities share a 
distinguishing moral essence.  Such a final answer seems integral to the framing of the 
question since advice for policy-making is supposed to be unambiguous and is considered 
flawed if it is not (Zehfuss 2002).  It does not suffice to present the apparent unsolvable limbo 
of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.   
This is further exacerbated by two other modern concerns which seem to bring about 
separate strategies for overcoming this predicament.  Firstly, the situation is incompatible 
with the modern notion of knowledge; i.e., to “construct a coherent representation that 
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excludes contesting interpretations” (Ashley & Walker 1990: 261).  This seems connoted to 
how different writers argue for the correctness of their position.  For instance, Brown 
highlights how Charles Beitz justifies his cosmopolitan approach to state autonomy by 
proving interdependence and the mistake in seeing states as individuals (1992: 114-8).  
Vivienne Jabri refers to this as an attempt of solving moral issues through epistemology 
(1998: 593).  In a related argument, Walker shows how epistemological inquiry has 
dominated Western philosophy with the effect that values are either separated from facts, or 
equated with how the world has become through modernisation (1993: 54).  Therefore, this 
strategy is also connected to the Enlightenment ideal of truth.  Claire Colebrook reads 
Foucault to argue that what we see as truth shifted with Enlightenment from being in “the 
force of words” (2005: 163) to “lay in what was said” (Foucault quoted in ibid: 164).  This 
calls for external motivations.  Hence, Walker’s critique directs us to a first strategy for 
reaching a conclusive answer to the question of ethics: namely supporting the answer with 
epistemological proof. 
Secondly, but not separated from the above concern, modern notions of accumulative 
science and progress (Halliday 1999: 106) also call for moving beyond the apparent stalemate 
of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in order to create a better world.  Hence, even 
though the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is founded in modernity (Brown 1992: 27), 
modern thinking also calls for overcoming this opposition.  This seems connected to another 
development that is not treated by Brown but relies on his dichotomy.  In that reading the 
cosmopolitan-communitarian debate is seen as an impasse that has to be overcome if we are 
to be able to aspire to a better world (Cochran 1999).  Since the cosmopolitan-communitarian 
dichotomy is seen as covering all there is to think about ethics in IR, the difficulty of 
adjudicating between the strands makes it sensible to believe that progress can be achieved 
through a middle position (see e.g. Erskine 2002; Frost 1996; Linklater 1998; Shapcott 2001).  
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However, for Walker this is part of the problem.  He argues that such attempts will be very 
tempting, but that this “must be a perpetual wandering on a road that is closed at both ends” 
(1993: 72).  Crucially, this reaffirms the terms of the debate, which – rather ironically – makes 
the search for progress in these terms an inherently conservative strategy.  Hence, Walker’s 
critique directs us to a second strategy which attempts to overcoming the impasse by a middle 
position.  
To conclude, it follows from Walker’s assumption of the historicity of ethics that it is in 
this constant rehashing of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate we reproduce and reaffirm 
the modernist ethics inherent in the principle of state sovereignty.  This, in conjuncture with 
claims that this is all there is to think about ethics, defines the limits of our political 
imagination and this brings us to the aim of Walker’s critique: an aspiration to open up for 
thinking differently.  The next section will briefly address what Walker sees as the way out. 
A new Machiavelli? 
Walker’s argues, in his critique of normative IR, that the reliance on the principle of state 
sovereignty impedes us from speaking of ethics in IR in a way that corresponds to our 
contemporary situation.  This then calls for a rethinking of ethics in IR, something that is 
considered rather urgent.  We are now at an historical juncture where temporal accelerations 
can no longer be captured in spatial categories, and this destabilises our old categories.  In 
other words, we seem to find ourselves in the position of Machiavelli. 
Hence, we need to rethink political community, but Walker himself is not all that specific 
about what this might mean.  Nevertheless, it is clear that this involves moving beyond the 
confines of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.  For instance, he argues that a “busier 
intersection [between ethics and IR] is no indication of an escape from the routines through 
which attempts to speak of ethics are either marginalised or trivialised.  These routines 
emerge from the way claims about ethical possibility are already constitutive of theories of 
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international relations.” (Walker 1993: 79)  Furthermore, it is rather obvious that Walker aims 
for an ethics that is not bound by the spatial limits of state sovereignty.  This is seen in his 
claim that contemporary conditions “will amplify the claim that a more universalistic account 
of human community is now called for” (ibid: 76).   
However, we have seen that Walker’s critique could be related to the question of ethics 
and even though his critique relies on a radically different question, his hopes for a more 
appropriate ethics seems likely to attract some of the criticism he voices.  Firstly, Walker’s 
critique targeted how the separation between ethics and politics was untenable and obscured 
the historical and political constitution of ethics in IR.  However, Walker calls for an ethics 
that is more appropriate to contemporary conditions.  His thus seems to aim for better policy, 
which implies a separation between politics and ethics.  Secondly, Walker’s critique 
highlighted how the answers in normative IR were intended to be final and universally 
applicable.  It seems likely that Walker’s call for a new ethics might attract this criticism as 
well.  In brief he can be taken to argue that if we could understand the contemporary world, 
we would also be able to formulate an appropriate ethics, which then seems to be a final 
answer.  Of course, this is a stereotyped picture of Walker’s argument and it is important to 
note that he admits that speaking of ethics in the way he does presupposes a certain 
universality (ibid: 74) and “the very possibility of something called ethics as we have come to 
understand it may well require fundamental reconsideration” (ibid: 79).  The way out seems to 
be to ask, “how universality and particularity might be rearticulated without capitulating to 
the modernist presumption that the different must always be resolved into the same” (ibid: 
78).  Nevertheless, this new ethics is likely to attract criticism for formulating a final and 
universally applicable answer to the question of ethics.  Finally, Walker’s critique highlighted 
two strategies that were used to justify the given answer: either by appealing to 
epistemological foundations or by formulating a middle position in the cosmopolitan-
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communitarian debate.  When claiming that contemporary conditions call for a new ethics, 
Walker also seeks a justification for his ethics and is likely to attract the first criticism since 
he seems to argue that these observations are in some way devoid of ethics or politics.  
Tensions thus appear when Walker moves beyond criticism.  In the next chapter this 
move, and the tensions it might lead to, is further explored by engaging with David 
Campbell’s attempts to rethink ethics in a way that is better in tune with contemporary 
conditions.  The reason for choosing Campbell is, in part, that his work might be seen as an 
answer to Walker’s call that “the most interesting ways forward will be opened up by those 
who seek to speak of the possibility of new forms of political community while resisting the 
resolutions that have made the demand that ethics be applied to international relations seems 
[sic] so reasonable.” (ibid: 80) 
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2  Campbell’s Poststructuralist Ethos 
David Campbell’s work contributes affirmatively to a poststructuralist ethics in IR and is 
perhaps the most elaborate in this vein.  This was also the reason why his work was selected.  
Importantly, his project is also in line with the trajectories that Walker drew up and this 
chapter addresses Campbell’s attempt of going beyond Walker’s critique.  This will be done 
with focus on how Campbell asks and answers the question of ethics aiming to tease out the 
differences and similarities to normative IR.  The tensions that were mentioned in the end of 
the preceding chapter will thus be further explored.  I will, however, begin by briefly 
introducing Campbell’s work in the same time as I make the connection to Walker.  In the 
second section I will then address how Campbell moves beyond the cosmopolitan-
communitarian debate focusing on his question and answers in relation to those in the 
preceding chapter.  Finally, I will briefly assess how this works out and thus provide the basis 
for the following chapter in which this will be more thoroughly analysed.  
Identity/Difference and Globalisation 
Campbell shares the concern of Walker that our political imagination restricts us from 
understanding our contemporary situation.  His focus is however not on the principle of state 
sovereignty, but on identity.  For instance, in National Deconstruction he claims that the 
prevailing conceptions of identity made the West fail in their responses to Bosnia (1998a, see 
also 1998c; 1993).  Campbell’s argument is informed by Derridean thought on the identity-
difference problematic and thus sees identity as performatively constituted in relation to 
difference (or différance)6.  Hence, identity cannot exist without difference, but this does not 
                                                
6 This line of reasoning is also instrumental to Walker’s thought, and the similarities between the two are 
therefore not surprising (e.g. Walker 1993: 123). 
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mean that the different always needs to be turned into something dangerous (Campbell 
1998c).  Crucially, the modern conception of identity makes us look for the same and the 
different in spatial categories and notably in states.  Campbell even argues that the narrow 
territorialized conception of identity, which is central to modern political thought, was part of 
the problem in Bosnia and a problem that was exacerbated by Western diplomatic efforts 
(1998a).  This is inherent in Campbell’s attempt to a “deterritorialization of responsibility” 
(ibid: 166) implying that there is a nexus between identity and territory (or sovereignty) in 
modern thought that we would be better off without (ibid: 165).  
Campbell’s work is in thus indicative of the trajectory for a more appropriate ethics that 
Walker sets out.  Indeed, he wants to move beyond seeing states as the only possible political 
community.  Campbell has also voiced a critique that is highly similar to that of Walker by 
criticising the idea of a distinction between normative and empirical theory and between IR 
and previously established principles (Campbell & Shapiro 1999).  Crucially these 
problematic distinctions “depend on the notion of a prior and autonomous sovereign 
subjectivity (whether it be the individual, the state, or some other corporate actor)” (ibid: viii).  
Campbell aims to go beyond these problems by establishing an ethos (implying that it is 
weaker and not as fixed as an ethics) that is supposed to be more in line with what 
contemporary world politics demands.  In that way, he also wants to prove that those who 
criticise poststructuralism for relativism and nihilism are wrong by showing how this 
literature carries an affirmative ethos7.  This ethos is supposed to avoid the pitfalls connoted 
with the conventional conception of ethics and normative IR.  Hence, he tries to 
reconceptualise political community and universality and think about politics rather than 
                                                
7 For Walker this does not necessarily seem like a problem since he argues that this uncertainty is a central 
feature of modernity – not post-modernity – and this is also why he finds modern writers like Weber just as 
informative as Derrida, Foucault and the likes (1993: 20). 
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ethics.  This resonates with what Walker saw as interesting and rewarding steps forward and 
how this is drawn up in detail will be the focus of the following section. 
A Politics of Affirming Alterity from an Ethos of Responsibility 
Campbell advocates a new policy in international relations which aims to ‘affirm alterity’.  
This principle “goes beyond the narrow and static confines of tolerance and maintains that the 
active affirmation of alterity must involve the desire to actively oppose and resist – perhaps, 
depending on the circumstances, even violently – those forces that efface, erase or suppress 
alterity.” (Campbell 1998a: 206)  In National Deconstruction (ibid) he deals with this in 
relation to the war in Bosnia.  His concern is how Western diplomats, politicians and 
international relations scholars responded to this crisis.  In brief, he argues that the enacted 
policy failed and that his policy recommendations would fare better in comparison.  This 
principle is thus thought to go beyond the narrow interpretation that is connoted with the 
principle of state sovereignty and a territorialized conception of identity.  It also leads to a 
particular form of politics and, also, to particular recommendations of courses of actions.  
With respect to the Bosnian case Campbell argues that this principle results in two guidelines:  
A variety of political strategies which on the one hand requires the constant pluralization of 
centers of power, sources of knowledge, loci of identification, and the spaces of community, 
while on the other hand recognizes that each deterritorialization necessitates and results in a 
reterritorialization, that in turn has to be disturbed (and so on). 
An emancipatory ideal of multiculturalism, which on the one hand affirms cultural diversity 
without situating it, while on the other hand recognizes that multiculturalism can itself 
succumb to an enclave mentality that suppresses cultural interdependence and plurality. 
(Campbell 1998a: 208) 
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Through these principles, then, Campbell argues there can be democracy in Bosnia that does 
not reduce politics to ethnicity.  Importantly, Campbell also sees this as applicable to 
contemporary multi-cultural Western societies (ibid: 167, 218).   
Campbell develops on his principle of affirming alterity in “Why Fight”, albeit in a 
slightly different context.  Here he argues that the context of “millennial chaos” cannot be 
captured in the “conventional political architecture and discursive resources of International 
Relations” and we thus fail to respond to crises such as those signified by names like “Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Chechnya, Somalia, Afghanistan, [and] Sudan” (Campbell 1998b: 479).  What is 
called for is instead a politics of affirming alterity which, in this case, motivates fighting and 
intervention.  Campbell admits that his position makes it difficult to formulate any hard and 
fast rules.  Indeed, this would contradict much of his purpose and his basic assumptions.  
However, he argues that this weaker principle provides a certain direction to decisions which 
“can better enable responses to disasters” (ibid: 519). 
We thus see that Campbell departs from the problematic identified and criticised by 
Walker – that the principle of state sovereignty (or a territorialized conception of political 
identity) makes us fail in responding to contemporary conditions – and argues that what is 
called for is a politics of alterity.  This solution seems to be a logical continuation of Walker’s 
work but also seems to be asking a similar question of ethics as normative IR in the sense of 
guiding the formulation of (state) policy.  Hence, even though the starting assumptions are 
quite different, Campbell’s work communicates with the literature that Walker (and 
Campbell) criticises.  
In terms of answering the question there are also some striking similarities between the 
kind of answers Campbell and the literature of Normative IR seeks.  Indeed, Campbell sees 
affirmation of alterity as following logically from a particular ethos or ethics, which makes it 
an ethical principle.  In this way it presupposes a certain universalism since it is supposedly 
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universally applicable.  Campbell argues that ethics presuppose universalism but ventures a 
different kind by departing from Derrida.  He recognises that doing so can be problematic 
since universality always “calls forth foundational elements of philosophical traditions that 
Derrida’s thought has sought to disclose, disturb, and dislodge” (Campbell 1998a: 199).  
Nevertheless, he argues that through Derrida’s thought, and in particular through the notion of 
“iterability”, it is possible to retain “a sense of the nonparticular that gives meaning to the 
particular” (ibid: 200).  Iterability, in brief, is the condition of possibility for communication 
since signifiers (or words) can only signify as long as they involve a remainder of the same 
even though they are constantly changing and never entirely the same (Zehfuss 2002: 200).  
For Campbell universality thus occurs in a repetition of the particular in which a remainder of 
the same is retained.  But there is always a remaining alterity or difference and the apparent 
unity of the universal is thus always in danger (1998a: 200).  Therefore, he does not study the 
Bosnian case to apply universal ethical principles, “but because we could not have enunciated 
the universal other than through the structure of iteration that produces and names the 
particular” (ibid: 207).  Hence, Campbell tries to reconceptualise the relationship between 
universality and particularity to avoid reducing the other into the same.  On this point 
Campbell’s effort is in line with Walker’s critique of normative IR.  However, Campbell still 
seems to argue that the principle can be universally applied.  For instance, in “Why Fight” 
Campbell introduces the problematic by listing a number of humanitarian crises to which this 
principle, if heeded, would improve our responses (Campbell 1998b: 497).  In other words, 
Campbell also aspires to a final answer to the question he poses – no other answers are 
necessary except for his. 
There are two converging inroads to Campbell’s ethos.  One of which is more interesting 
for my purpose here.  I will however begin by delineating the other inroad since it is 
important in Campbell’s work and gives a background to his argument.  Firstly, Campbell 
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argues – even though this is a bit pointedly expressed – that if we accept deconstructive 
thought we also need to accept the principle of affirming alterity8.  This goes hand in hand 
with the aim to highlight the affirmative character of deconstruction (see above).  In 
Campbell’s view, deconstruction – or political criticism – has a basic ethicality “because of its 
orientation to the call of the other” which makes it far from nihilistic (1998a: 182) and 
because such thought implies resisting totalitarianism whether it is political or ontological 
(1998a: 4; 2005).9  This boils down to what in deconstructive thought is called the “double 
contradictory imperative”; i.e., “thinking the limit yet going beyond it, maintaining a 
commitment to reason by questioning its operation and that which escapes it, and resisting the 
inside/outside demarcation while exposing how the outside inhabits and helps constitute the 
inside”10 (Campbell 1998a: 198).  Therefore, “‘deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response 
to an alterity which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it’” (ibid: 129).  Hence, by 
accepting deconstruction, we also need to affirm alterity – sometimes even by violent 
resistance (Campbell 1998b).  But, crucially, this also depends on a leap of faith for prior 
                                                
8 This is of course a rather contestable contention and others have questioned Campbell’s reading of Derrida on 
this point (e.g. Edkins 2005; Fagan 2006) 
9 It is interesting to note that Campbell connects the ethos of deconstructive thought to Enlightenment and 
democracy (1998a: 201).  This reading of democracy relies on Campbell moving beyond the more conventional 
institutionalist view by talking about a “spirit” of democracy that is thought to involve indeterminacy and 
constant debate over options to which there are no secure foundations (ibid: 195-6). Campbell’s definition of 
democracy is thus reminiscent of deconstructive thought, and the convergence in terms of ethos does not seem 
that surprising.  Therefore, Campbell’s contention that “deconstructive thought is necessary for … a democratic 
politics” (ibid: 202) is not surprising and, more importantly, does not tell us that much since this is true by 
definition. 
10 This, however, only appears to be contradictory “if one succumbs to the blackmail of the Enlightenment” 
(Campbell 1998a: 198) 
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acceptance of deconstructive thought.  This is, nevertheless, rather similar to some of the 
motivations that we saw in the preceding chapter where particular moral philosophies were 
invoked to substantiate particular policies.  It must be noted, of course, that the line of thought 
that Campbell draws on is not what is commonly encompassed by moral philosophy, but the 
strategy in finding the answer is similar.  
Campbell’s second motivation is more substantive.  Here he takes as point of departure 
how a politics of affirming alterity would be better suited to respond to world events.  He 
argues that the ontological, or ‘onto-political’11, assumptions that underlie these policies 
prevent proper responses.  In this way Campbell highlights the politics of ontological 
assumptions.  In “Why Fight” he argues that the character of “the political violence of the 
post-Cold War era” spurs “the formation of ‘emergent political complexes’ which disturb the 
conventional cartography of the international order” and that “their importance can no longer 
be dissimulated by geopolitical modes of representation” (ibid: 497).  The onto-political 
presumptions guiding these defunct modes of representations thus prevent “the development 
of a politics of responsibility potentially better attuned to the context of crisis” (ibid: 501).  In 
National Deconstruction the same argument is reiterated as Campbell claims that 
“conventional understandings of international violence have little purchase on the complexity 
of the war in Bosnia” and thus “seeks to explore the ethical and political possibilities enabled 
by poststructuralist thought” (1998a: 3).  For Campbell the political imaginary of state 
sovereignty – or in his words the nexus between (political) identity and territory – makes us 
                                                
11 The ‘onto-political’ is a term that Campbell borrows from William Connolly, whose work is close to that of 
Campbell.  “To say that political interpretation is ‘onto-political’ highlights the way in which ‘it contains 
fundamental presumptions that establish the possibilities within which its assessment of actuality is presented.’  
This dimension is more often than not occluded within the human sciences, particularly by those accounts that 
depend upon unacknowledged assumptions about an unproblematic reality.” (Campbell 2005: 128) 
  28 
fail to understand and react to the problematic of Bosnia (ibid: 165-6).  We cannot respond 
properly without a “deterritorialization of responsibility” (ibid: 166).  Campbell’s aim is an 
approach that is more appropriate, but at the same time more self-conscious about its onto-
political assumptions (ibid: 23).   
Campbell’s solution is an onto-political position derived mainly from the work of Levinas 
and Derrida.  This is based in deconstructive thought and how “our condition can be 
characterised by the problematic of identity/difference, where neither term can be understood 
except in relation to the other, and because of which claims about secure identities, 
traditionally authorized grounds, and the political necessities said to flow from them are met 
with a critical scepticism” (1998b: 509). Hence, the subject is thought to be constituted 
through a process of identity and difference and our existence as subjects thus stems from our 
relation to the Other.  Therefore, responsibility to the other comes before our subjectivity.  
Ethics thus comes to precede philosophy and this makes Campbell’s reconceptualisation 
radically different from conventional ethics founded in epistemologically. (1998a: 174)  This 
also makes the ethical subject radically different from the subject in normative IR, which is 
thought to pre-exist all ethical relations “deploying either a putatively universal moral code 
(the deontological view) or muddling through the situation in order to achieve what might be 
thought of as the best possible outcome (the consequentialist account)” (ibid: 12).  
Since the subject is thought to be constituted only through its relations with the Other, 
responsibility also loses its previous meaning as a choice (ibid: 165).  Instead, responsibility is 
the relation with the other that makes possible our highly interdependent condition of being in 
the first place (Campbell 2005: 131; Campbell 1998a: 173).  Indeed, “one’s being has to be 
affirmed in terms of a right to be in relation to the Other” (Campbell 1998a: 174).  Here 
Campbell goes on to quote Levinas who writes that “One has to respond to one’s right to be, 
not by referring to some abstract and anonymous law, or judicial entity, but because of one’s 
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fear for the Other” (Levinas quoted in ibid: 174).  The freedom of the subject is dependent on 
a prior relationship to the Other which makes “how response-ability can be fostered and 
exercised” the problem for Campbell (ibid: 12) rather than arguing for this responsibility.   
However, it seems to me that Campbell’s argument is rather similar in form to the ones 
forwarded in normative IR.  Therefore, he also appears to be more concerned to argue for why 
we should feel responsible rather than how this can be fostered.  Hence, notwithstanding the 
differences in content, it seems that Campbell’s answer draws on many of the argumentative 
strategies that were criticised in the preceding chapter. 
Another Ethos Guiding Policy? 
Campbell’s argument is in many respects diametrically opposed to that of the conventional 
literature in normative IR as described in the preceding chapter.  For instance, Campbell tries 
to evade the territorialized conception of identity that dominates in Western political thought 
and draws on a radically different notion of subjectivity than the individual autonomous 
subject that cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives rely on.  He also attempts to 
reformulate the relationship between the particular and the universal.  Essentially Campbell 
moves beyond Walker’s critique by arguing that there is an ethos connoted with 
poststructuralist thought – and in particular deconstruction – and that this ethos logically leads 
to a principle of affirming alterity that guides the direction or basic content of politics.  
Crucially, this ethos is thought to (1) take us away from the highly problematic nexus of 
identity and territory (what Walker describes as inherent in the predominance of the principle 
of state sovereignty as a frame for our political imagination) and (2) is better in tune with the 
challenges of the contemporary world.  Notwithstanding, the differences and the attempt to 
move beyond the narrow confines of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, there also seem 
to be some important similarities. 
  30 
First, Campbell’s politics of affirming alterity and its basis in the ethos of responsibility 
seems to be asking the same question as the literature of normative IR does.  This involves a 
separation between politics and ethics, or the principles that policies rely on.  Second, the 
question seems to presuppose that the answer is somehow final which, in turn, presupposes a 
notion of universalism.  Both Walker and Campbell argued that this might be inherent to 
speaking about ethics, but at least it presents them with a problem.  Third, even though 
Campbell argues that ontology is political, he anchor his argument in a description of reality 
and argue that the principle he advocates would be more appropriate for this reality.  Hence, 
he tries to find proof for why the principle of affirming alterity is better suited to 
contemporary conditions (something that he seems to share with Walker).  This resembles 
how norms were decided epistemologically in the literature of normative IR.  Finally, both 
writers use virtually the same argumentative strategies as we saw in normative IR.  This might 
be necessary, but it might also rely on assumptions that are in tension with the assumptions of 
poststructuralist thought.  These tensions will be explored in the next chapter.   
In order to summarise, it seems that Campbell evades Walker’s critique when it comes to 
the content of the argument.  However, in terms of the form of the argument and the questions 
that are asked, the differences are less obvious.  This is perhaps a necessary part of trying to 
communicate with the literature of normative IR or the wider discourse of IR theory.  
However, in the next chapter I will argue that this might not be unproblematic.  Rather, in 
doing this Campbell and Walker also encounter the same problems that they criticise.  
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3  Poststructuralism and the Question of Ethics 
This chapter aims to analyse the insights from the preceding chapters.  In brief, these have 
highlighted that notwithstanding the substantial differences in content between Campbell’s 
argument and those presented in the cosmopolitan-communitarian exchange, the form of the 
argument is similar.  This seemed related to the tensions in Campbell’s work.  Here I will 
discuss how these tensions relate to the framing of the question of ethics, the answers it calls 
for and the link between the two.  First, however, it is important to note that this should not be 
read as a critique of Campbell through Walker.  Rather, Campbell departs from Walker’s 
critique, and Walker sets out a trajectory for overcoming the problems he identifies that is in 
line with Campbell’s work.  Hence, this is a discussion on both writers and the question of 
ethics in IR.   
The argument will be presented in three steps.  Firstly, I address the framing of the 
question and the answer it seems to presuppose.  Then I turn to the problems that Campbell 
(and Walker) encounters when trying to fit their argument into the conventions of the 
question.  Finally, I will return to the question of ethics and discuss how the question works as 
a limit for critical thought.  
Framing the Question 
The question of ethics in IR is generally framed in terms of what should be done.  This might 
be asked with respect to a particular case or in a more general sense but it seems that the aim 
is to argue for some sort of action.  This is the case, as we saw, both in the literature of 
normative IR and in Campbell’s work.  In Brown’s reading of normative IR we saw questions 
such as What is the right thing to do about world poverty? In other words, what we in the 
more affluent part of the world should be obliged to do.  For Campbell the question was how 
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the West should respond to crises like the one in Bosnia.  Ethics thus conceived offers a 
direction, or even content, to politics and policy before decision-makers are allowed in, and it 
works by defining what is not negotiable.  Another way of seeing it could be that the question 
is asked in way as to allow the one who is asking to promote policy recommendations.  
The answer to this question thus resides in convincingly showing why something should 
be exempted from discussion and debate – from politics.  The literature of normative IR is 
interesting here since it works as a stepping-stone for Campbell’s work through Walker’s 
critique.  As we saw in chapter 1, Walker’s critique indicated that for an answer to be taken 
seriously it was supposed to be derived from the canon of moral thought as represented 
through the cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy.  Even though Campbell does not accept 
this premise, his reasoning is reminiscent of that which Brown identifies as proper normative 
IR.  Campbell also tries to work through moral philosophy by starting from Levinas.  Of 
course, he claims that deconstruction precedes philosophy (Campbell 2005: 130), but as his 
argument goes this is of lesser importance.  Indeed, he tries to justify the principles he 
delineates.   
This problem leads to a second.  Indeed, how can we justify basing our work in one set of 
philosophical principles or moral codes and not in any other possible set?  Here we saw two 
different strategies in normative IR.  The first attempted to prove the correctness of particular 
norms through epistemology; i.e., by proving correspondence to the world.  The second 
attempted a middle position in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, without being 
separated from the wish for epistemological proof.  Campbell’s work is particularly different 
from the latter strategy since he does not accept the terms of the debate that makes 
accommodation a possible answer.  Nevertheless, he shares with these writers a concern to 
move beyond the stale division of cosmopolitans and communitarians.  However, his answer 
is actually rather similar to the former strategy.  Campbell’s principles are justified and 
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motivated in a comparable manner12.  He seems to argue – as does Walker – that we need 
principles that are better in tune with observations they make of world politics which will 
better equip us to deal with this reality.  This adherence to the same kind of question and 
answer also led to problematic tensions, which will be addressed in the next section.  
Answering the Question of Ethics from a Critical Perspective 
It turns out that Campbell asks virtually the same question as in normative IR, and seeks a 
similar answer – not in content but in form.  In the preceding chapter I alluded to four sets of 
tensions in Campbell’s work that seemed related to the question of ethics.  These tensions will 
here be explored in further detail.  
Firstly, the framing of the question of ethics seems to require a separation between 
politics and ethics.  Indeed, just asking for principles and codes that give a direction or 
content to politics that is exempted from political debate presuppose that we can in some way 
separate the two.  This was at the centre of Walker’s critique.  It can be said, however, that 
Campbell tries to overcome this problem by arguing that ethics is always political, but this 
renders his conception of ethics as a codification of politics, which, then, can work as a guide 
for politics (Fagan 2006).  Hence, the choice of point of departure – i.e. deconstruction – is to 
be seen as a political one, but one that then in a second step can work as a guide for politics.  
This separation is problematic since there is unclear why Campbell should be the one making 
such political decisions.  In this context is worth reflecting on why scholars should have the 
power over ethics (see e.g. Edkins 2005).  Furthermore, Fagan (2006) and Edkins (2005) 
                                                
12 It is worth remembering at this point that Campbell presented two converging yet separable justification and 
that the one based in the logical ethical corollaries of deconstructive thought is not the one referred to here.  
Rather, what is discussed here is the view that there is a political objective that can be met through relying on 
deconstruction. 
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criticise Campbell for separating ethics and politics since this is incoherent with Derrida’s 
thought on undecideability and the impossibility of ethics.  In short, they read Derrida to 
indicate that politics, and thus responsibility, only can occur if the decision is made in a 
situation of aporia; i.e. where there is an experience of the impossibility of a decision. (see 
also Zehfuss 2002: 231)  Hence, the ethics that Campbell devises is always already political, 
which he admits (2005), but it also removes responsibility since it predefines a content to 
politics and in this way removes the decision.  This critique relies on a reading of Derrida that 
focuses on the decision whereas Campbell’s reading sees the principle of affirming alterity as 
following logically from deconstructive thought.  I will not attempt to adjudicate between the 
two, but it is enough for my purposes to note that asking the question of ethics seems to create 
a tension in Campbell’s work when it comes to the separation between ethics and politics.  
This is also noted by Fagan who argues that the question is the reason for these tensions 
(2006: 28-30) and by Franke who argues that questions are ethical only if they are treated as 
answerable (2000: 326).  It thus seems that the question of ethics in IR presupposes a 
separation between ethics and politics, which introduces, if asked, a tension in 
poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR. 
A second problem is that the framing of the question seems to demand a final answer.  
Indeed, we saw that this was the ambition in the more conventional literature of normative IR, 
notwithstanding Chris Brown’s contention that no such answer was readily available.  It also 
seems to be the ambition of Campbell and Walker, although the latter does not endeavour to 
find this answer.  This relates to the question of universalism since a final answer also is 
universally applicable.  Indeed, the debate about ethics seems, as Walker noted, to presuppose 
a certain universality.  We saw that this was true even for communitarian approaches and the 
answer to the question of ethics seems to be formulated as a universally valid principle 
regardless of its foundation.  Importantly, Walker and Campbell are also looking for 
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universalism.  Although this is a slightly different universalism, it is rather obvious in 
Campbell’s writing that his principles are supposed to be universally valid and applicable – 
resistance against totalitarianism is always to be exercised.  For Walker it is equally obvious 
that he is calling for universal principles that can replace the old ones.  Jim George identifies 
this as a crucial question for postmodernists who engage with ethics in IR (1995: 211).  I will 
not try to answer whether Campbell and Walker succeeds in their attempts of overcoming 
what is seen as a problematic universality and if theirs is in some way less problematic, but it 
seems that the question demands something that is difficult for them to deal with.  In this way 
Walker seems to be correct in arguing that the ethics, as we know it, presuppose a certain 
universality.  Moreover, the notion of universality is also problematic since it presupposes that 
the bases for the advocated principles are somehow extra-cultural or shared by all humans.  
This is the main problem that Franke (2000) targets, arguing that responsibility (in a 
Derridean sense) is thwarted if we retain this idea of the international.  He thus disqualifies 
Campbell’s attempt to formulate an ethics for still attempting to be globally acceptable and 
therefore presupposing a uniform humanity.  In this way Campbell also risks “capitulating to 
the modernist premise that the different must always be resolved into the same” (Walker 
1993: 78).  His ethos is obviously contingent and situated in a particular context and it seems 
difficult to argue that it should with necessity extend to all others.  Hence, even though the 
authors attempt a different and qualified universalism, such a notion seems to be integral to 
asking the question of ethics and to induce problems they have to deal with.   
Thirdly, tensions occur from Campbell’s attempts to motivate his principle of affirming 
alterity.  This is also the main point of contact between his and Walker’s work.  They both 
make analyses of contemporary world politics that call for a new, more appropriate, ethics.  
This is reminiscent of the epistemological adjudication between norms, or what Jim George 
describes as deriving ought from is (1995: 202).  The strategy was common in the 
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cosmopolitan-communitarian debate and is something that both Walker and Campbell are 
critical of.  It seems that such an anchorage13 of the norms they rely on is a necessary 
corollary of the question they ask (see Cochran 1999).  For Walker this anchorage lies in the 
claim that temporal accelerations distinguishes contemporary conditions from previous and 
for Campbell in the analysis that the conventional conceptions are the reason behind the 
failure of the Western response to Bosnia and similar crises.  Walker and Campbell thus make 
assertions about a reality that is supposed to demand a particular ethics and disqualify other 
approaches.   
This is problematic since it relies on the assumption that principles can match the world in 
a more or less accurate manner, and that we can actually adjudicate between contending 
principles.  This is a very dubious contention especially in light of Walker and Campbell’s 
view on the historical constitution of reality.  Furthermore, it resembles what Maja Zehfuss 
(2002) in a critical discussion refers to as the “politics of reality”.  Zehfuss argues, through a 
reading of Derrida, that politics can only occur if we accept that all representations of reality 
are already political.  Hence, it seems to be a tension in Campbell’s work since his heavy 
reliance on Derrida is difficult to combine with his assertion that the situation in Bosnia 
demands a particular ethics.  Hence, Campbell’s critique of how onto-political assumptions 
have influenced mainstream interpretations of Bosnia (1998a: chapter 3) is difficult to 
reconcile with what seems to be an underlying assumption that his interpretation in some way 
manages to elude this difficulty.  It is important to note, however, that Campbell qualifies his 
argument by arguing that it is not to be seen as the correct interpretation, rather he wants to 
problematise the conventional interpretation (e.g. 1999a).  Nevertheless, his reliance on that 
                                                
13 This is Molly Cochran’s (1999) notion that she sees as necessary for talking about ethics and is briefly put a 
weaker form of foundation and a way of trying to avoid the search for firm foundations that, inter alia, 
poststructuralists are highly critical of.  
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analysis is central to his justification of the ethics that makes possible responding to Bosnia.  
The same problem also occurs in Walker’s work; his reliance on temporal accelerations is 
difficult to reconcile with his view that our conceptions of the world are historically 
contingent.  Therefore, the framing of the question of ethics in IR seems to presuppose an 
answer that can be justified not only through recourse to philosophy but also by reference to 
some aspect of reality.  In brief, motivations that refer to some given reality are difficult to 
combine with poststructuralist sensitivities for the impossibility of accessing this reality in an 
unmediated form (George 1995: 208).  
Finally, it seems that the very argumentative strategy that is used by Campbell leads to 
tensions since it presupposes that the reader is a knowing subject.  Indeed, the argument 
seems to take part in constituting us as autonomous choosers who in, strikingly well defined, 
moments of decision can consult ethical principles that guide our choices.  That is the case 
both in the literature of normative IR and in the work of Campbell since both tries to provide 
such rules of thumb.  The whole idea of motivating the principle of affirming alterity by how 
it stems from a poststructuralist subjectivity seems contradictory since this subjectivity would 
imply that responding to the other no longer is a choice (Campbell 1999b: 463).  Hence, there 
should be no need for motivations.  It is true, however, that Campbell argues that the aim 
should be to work out “how response-ability can be fostered and exercised” (1998a: 12), but it 
still seems that he tries to provide the subject with part of the content of their informed 
choices and thus takes part in constituting the modern subject.  The problem is less 
straightforward than the three above, and it might be part of a general difficulty of trying to 
formulate a poststructuralist position in modernist terms.  We can also ask ourselves whether 
it is possible to argue differently and it is important to note that neither Walker nor Campbell 
claims that poststructuralism is anything else than closely attached to modernity.  
Nevertheless, this problematic poses the question whether it is possible to retain a 
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conventional form of argument without presupposing that the subject in some way stands 
independent and autonomous.   
To conclude, the condition of possibility of these tensions seems to reside in the division 
between ethics and politics.  This provides for the necessity and possibility of the other 
problems.  Hence, the framing of the question seems to make for these tensions.  Furthermore, 
all tensions seem connected to how the question of ethics is framed in modernist terms.  This 
is perhaps less obvious when it comes to the discussion on universalism and Walker seems to 
argue that the question of competing claims to universalism and particularism is a question 
that we always have grappled with (Walker 1993, see also Hansen 1997).  But Campbell and 
Walker still had to address the modern conception of universality since it was connoted with 
the question.  It is of course important to remember that neither writer claims that 
poststructuralism offers a clean break with modernity, and this critique might therefore not be 
entirely warranted.  However, if we refrain from seeing it as a criticism, it makes obvious how 
the question of ethics in IR is framed in modern categories and if it, as Walker argues, is 
necessary to be suspicious of these categories in order to speak about ethics (1993: 52), our 
suspicion should include the question as well.   
The Question as Limit 
It seems that the question of ethics in IR creates problems for Walker and Campbell and in 
some respects even make them argue in ways that lead to tensions in their work.  Asking this 
question is thus not as unproblematic as it would seem.  Walker’s contention that “the very 
possibility of something called ethics as we have come to understand it may well require 
fundamental reconsideration” is relevant here (1993: 79).  But neither Walker nor Campbell 
attempts to go beyond the question of ethics, even though it must be said to rely on a 
conventional conception of ethics.  The question thus functions as a limit for the critical 
thought both writers try to effectuate.  
  39 
But what is it in the question that limits our thought?  As we saw above, the question of 
ethics in IR is framed in modernist categories and trying to answer it therefore presupposes 
that these categories are, at least partly, heeded.  There are several plausible reasons for this: 
On the one hand, questions might be tightly connected to the assumptions or theories that 
have functioned as a background when asking them.  Indeed, different assumptions and 
theories make for different questions.  In this way it would not make sense for a writer in a 
poststructuralist vein to ask realist questions.  The underlying assumptions of the realist 
questions are not compatible with poststructuralism and hence the question does not make 
sense. (e.g. Zalewski 1996)  It remains unclear why the question of ethics in IR should be any 
different.  Indeed, in many ways Walker’s critique can, as we saw in chapter 1, be read as 
undermining the possibility of the question of ethics.  For instance, the question presupposes 
that ethics is a realm separable from politics; otherwise there would be no question of ethics, 
only questions of politics.  Yet, Campbell’s work – which is in line with the trajectory set out 
by Walker – takes this question at face value.   
On the other hand, there are conventions to how the question should be answered.  In a 
first instance, different questions call for different theoretical tools.  Hidemi Suganami (1996) 
has shown how different questions about war demand answers that rely on specific theoretical 
assumptions.  If this is not met, the answer lacks coherence.  Again it remains unclear why 
this should not be applicable to the question of ethics.  In a second instance, when asking a 
question, we also communicate with the literature that formulates the conventional answers.  
For Campbell and Walker this amounts to communicating with the literature of normative IR 
even though both reject the assumptions of this literature.  In other words, Campbell, in 
particular, has to convince normative IR theorists of the plausibility in his approach.  It is 
likely that this calls for particular justificatory strategies.  Furthermore, the question can also 
be thought to summon up a particular form, or kind, of answer.  In an argument that can be 
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related to this, Hayden White (e.g. 1987) has claimed that there is a content to the form of 
historical accounts; i.e. that the form of the argument influences its very content.  As different 
kinds of historical accounts also seems to come with different questions, White’s argument 
can be taken to imply that the form of the answer the question calls for also has a particular 
content to it.  Hence, by asking the question of ethics we already commit to a particular form 
of answer and, crucially, to a certain content to this answer.  Using a particular literature and 
its question of preference as a stepping-stone is problematic since in doing so we also buy into 
the conventions regarding the kinds of answers that are considered acceptable or potentially 
convincing.  In this way, what seems to be logical in terms of an answer might actually work 
as a limit.  With regard to the question of ethics, the content seems difficult to reconcile with 
poststructuralist thought and to create tensions in the work of Campbell and Walker.  This is 
particularly obvious when it comes to the justificatory strategies that are used and how the 
form of the argument partakes in the constitution of the modern subject. 
In this way, asking the question of ethics – as framed in IR – limits the possibilities for 
critical thought.  In order to answer the question that Campbell asks, and Walker alludes to, it 
seems that particular moves have to be made.  Moves that are not necessarily consistent with 
the assumptions of these writers and seem to contradict the critique of normative IR that 
provides the starting point for their work.  By asking the question of ethics we have already – 
or so it seems – committed to some of the categories that Walker and Campbell want to 
remain sceptical of.  Hence, we might say that the question forms a limit for the critique that 
both writers are intent on making.  Their arguments, and notably Campbell’s, therefore partly 
fail in their ambition to formulate a critical argument about ethics in IR since they ask a 
question which is inappropriate for this task.   
Importantly, failing to question the question is not only problematic as a limit for our 
thought; it also risks reifying the terms of the debate.  On the one hand, by doing this they 
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make Walker’s critical question seem ‘only critical’ and somewhat insufficient since it lacks 
constructive aspects.  On the other hand, in contemporary IR theory, poststructuralism is 
generally seen as the farthest possible from the mainstream.  Considering the discipline’s 
predilection for binary divisions, there is a risk that Campbell’s ethos and normative IR come 
to form the end points of yet another dichotomy.  This might be broader than the 
cosmopolitan-communitarian exchange, but still prevents us from questioning the question.  
Hence, the debate is normalised once again and that which lies beyond becomes nonsensical, 
illogical and unnecessary.  Most would agree, of course, that poststructuralism is far from 
being that accepted, and it could also be argued that such a situation still would be better than 
the one we are in today.  These objections notwithstanding, I find it dangerous to accept the 
situation – also from a poststructuralist vantage point – since it would limit the debate in ways 
described above.  Indeed, it would be to give legitimacy to the question of ethics as 
conventionally framed and thus limit the possibilities of critical thought.  
In sum then, there are reasons to believe that the answer might not be all that easy to 
separate from the question of ethics and that the question calls for a particular form of answer.  
Campbell and Walker share the highly commendable aim of trying to make the world a better 
place to live through better politics.  However, this aim makes them ask a question that calls 
for a type of answer which contradicts their basic assumptions.  It seems, and this might not 
be all that surprising, that keeping the question but giving a radically different answer does 
not work particularly well.  This is supported both in the theoretical discussion in this section, 
and in tensions that were highlighted in the work of Walker and, more obviously, Campbell.  
Therefore, it might not only be difficult to speak about ethics in IR under contemporary 
conditions, as Walker argues, it might even be difficult to speak about ethics at all. 
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have critically engaged the work of R.B.J. Walker and David Campbell.  
This was done by asking the question What does Walker’s and Campbell’s respective 
contributions to poststructuralist thought on ethics in IR tell us about the question of ethics in 
terms of its framing, the answers it calls for and the link between the two?  My answer was 
then formulated in three steps: Firstly, I delineated Walker’s critique of normative IR.  This 
was done with focus on how his critique could be read to undermine the framing of, and 
answers to, the question of ethics in normative IR.  Secondly, I saw Campbell’s work on an 
ethos of deconstruction as a continuation of Walker’s critique and discussed how Campbell 
treats the question of ethics.  Campbell’s work showed us how we could avoid the influence 
of the principle of state sovereignty that Walker targets in his critique.  However, Campbell 
asks the same question of ethics as the literature of normative IR and his work also seemed to 
be open for some of Walker’s critique.  The third chapter then addressed the link between the 
question of ethics and the problems we saw in normative IR and Campbell’s work.  There I 
argued that it might not be possible to answer the question of ethics without subscribing to 
some of the assumptions that Walker was critical of, and that the question thus becomes a 
limit for critical thought on ethics in IR.  
This leads me to a dual conclusion.  A cautious conclusion would claim that it is very 
difficult for poststructuralists to address the question of ethics as framed in IR.  Doing this 
namely seems to induce tensions in the argument.  Indeed, poststructuralist concern for the 
political, decentering the subject and historical constituted reality seems difficult to combine 
with asking the question of ethics.  The task for poststructuralists thus seems to be to explore 
different questions about ethics in IR – as Walker does when discussing how IR is already 
ethically situated.   
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If we, on the other hand, accept the assumptions of poststructuralism and the positioning 
of this line of thought within modernity, a more extensive conclusion can be reached.  Indeed, 
then my investigation would indicate that the difficulty is not so much one of asking the 
question of ethics in the contemporary world within modern categories; rather, it might be 
very difficult to ask the question of ethics at all.  Hence, the question of ethics as framed in 
normative IR, and in Walker and Campbell’s work, would appear to constitute a limit to what 
can be thought and said about ethics in IR.  Talking about ethics in any other way would not 
make sense, implying that such deliberations fall outside of this limit.  By continuing to ask 
this question Walker and Campbell helps constitute the debate of ethics in IR in a manner that 
they start out by criticising and the ethos of political criticism that Campbell advocates thus 
becomes a convenient position against which the attempts of accommodation in the 
cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy can be formulated.  In this way Walker and 
Campbell actually partake in circumscribing the debate and disqualifying for instance 
Walker’s critique of normative IR from what is thought to be relevant to ethics in IR.  
But, then, what does this mean?  Is this the end of talking about ethics?  Mark Franke 
formulates this dilemma in two questions that are generated by critical thought on ethics in 
IR:  “first, is it really possible to make such a break with ethics?  And, second, is it not the 
case that breaking the ethics would also force the possibility of responsible conduct from 
one’s grasp as well?” (Franke 2000: 325)  Like Franke, I believe that questions of ethical 
conduct will not disappear and indeed it is by debating ethics that ethics is constituted.  
However, I also believe – again like Franke – that this debate is better of without framing the 
question of ethics as answerable and applicable to everyone, everywhere.  However, when it 
comes to the second question I am reluctant to make any suggestions.  Franke would have it 
that responsibility might only occur if no rules for ethical conduct existed since then “a person 
can do nothing than respond at all points” (ibid: 327).  This seems to be in line with some of 
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the readings of Derrida that we also encountered in the last chapter (Fagan 2006; Zehfuss 
2002; 2005).  I will refrain both from making any judgement on the reading of Derrida and 
from trying to solve the problem that is identified.  However, I do believe that it is interesting 
to keep asking what this line of thought means for ethical conduct, albeit I doubt the 
possibility of finding an answer.  I also wonder why this debate should be confined to 
scholarly debate. 
All this notwithstanding, Walker and Campbell’s work open up the debate about ethics in 
IR.  This is a commendable contribution since it seems to me that the debate in normative IR, 
in spite of the good intentions of its participants, navigates a terrain where actions that should 
never be possible to justify simply are taken for granted.  This, sadly, tends to result in 
predominantly pessimistic appraisals on what we can hope for in international ethics.  Since 
debates about ethics draw up what is ethical in IR, Campbell’s contribution might broaden the 
possibility for and scope of ethics in IR and I take such a concern to be what motivates both 
Walker and Campbell.  However, I worry that they circumscribe the possibility and strength 
of their own critique when they move on to ask the question of ethics themselves.  
Therefore, if this dissertation entails any recommendations for future research, it would 
be to direct our attention to how we can ask questions of ethics differently and what this might 
mean.  Walker’s critique is one such example.  Other different question might include asking 
what it would mean to take the power over the ethical away from scholarly debate.  It could 
also imply reinforcing the efforts to denaturalise the conventional conception of ethics in IR 
and to open up what is seen to be legitimate in the field of ethics in IR.  Importantly, we need 
to be aware that such questions do not make our work less political. 
Finally, a seemingly logical corollary of this investigation would be an attempt to move 
beyond my critique and solve the problems that I have identified.  However, this would be 
contradictory to my conclusions.  Indeed, doing so would also be limited by the framing of 
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the question.  This does not mean that we should refrain from asking the question of ethics, 
but we need to be aware of how it limits our thought and doing so would therefore necessitate 
a more extensive treatment than is possible here.  It thus remains established what it might 
mean to speak about ethics without asking the question of ethics. 
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